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The Role of Performance Measurement in the Public Administration Discipline: Then and
Now

The origin of this paper is in an assertion I made in another paper to the effect that
performance measurement was central to the discipline of public administration in the
early twentieth century. A reviewer objected that I had not demonstrated this claim and I
agreed. To demonstrate it would require another paper, not just a short extension of that
paper, so I removed the assertion. This is that other paper. Originally it concerned the
relationship between performance measurement and the public administration discipline;
however, as it developed it has come to concern budgeting and reporting – with a
performance or results focus – and the discipline.
In then next few paragraphs, I make some fairly uncontroversial assertions about
the origins of the Americani discipline of public administration. I make them for two
reasons, one is to inform those readers who may be unfamiliar with these matters and the
other is to set the context for an argument that is not so familiar. Those readers who are
familiar with these contextual claims should be alert to nuanced differences between my
account and those found in the works of others such as Dwight Waldo or Laurence Lynn
(Lynn 1996; Waldo 1948, 1955; White 1965a, 1965b, 1965c; White and Schneider 1965).
The American discipline of public administration arose in an unprecedented
period of governmental experimentation. In the large scope: The entire nineteenth
century saw expanded electoral franchise. The first half of the century saw expansion of
democratic institutions through election of a great variety of state and local officials.
Jacksonian political theory offered, in principle, all citizens of ordinary intelligence an
opportunity to participate in government through governmental employment, thereby
2

establishing the underlying justification for what is now called “representative
bureaucracy.” The second half of the century saw organization of government through
extra-legal methods – primarily the local and state political parties – which led to
corruption and incompetence. The experience of these faults led to serial reform
movements that ultimately led to replacing a decentralized and representative government
with a much more hierarchical, coordinated and expert government. The rise of the
American discipline of public administration at the beginning of the twentieth century is
found in the academic support for the hierarchical, coordinated and expert government.
Thus, the American discipline of public administration arises in a political
controversy between democratic control of government and competent achievement of
governmental ends. We are sometimes misled to believe that the solution ultimately
achieved, strict hierarchical government, was universally accepted. It was not. In his
early writings, Frank Goodnow appears to recommend parliamentary government
(Goodnow 1893). E. Dana Durand, who was a professor at Stanford in 1900 and the
director of the US Census Bureau in 1910, argued in favor of giving city council, not the
mayor, more power (Durand 1900a, 1900b). Others who offered alternatives to the
singular executive model included John Commons and Clinton Woodruff, who was the
Secretary of the National Municipal League (Commons 1902; Woodruff 1903). The
commission form of city government, which was popular for about a decade around
1910, assigns executive power to a small legislature rather than to form a strict executive
hierarchy.
Nevertheless, there was considerable intellectual support movement towards
executive government. There was a shift from a negative to a positive view of the role of
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government. For example, Albert Shaw speaks of socialistic objectives of government
without moral rancor. These socialistic objectives include such ordinary services as the
delivery of a safe water supply (Shaw 1897). Second, Frank Goodnow argued that
hierarchy, even corrupt hierarchy, provides the coordination that democratic
decentralization has rendered impossible at the local level in the United States (Goodnow
1900). Third, there was the development of an anti-legislative view, the essential element
of which is that even honest legislators are subject to the wasteful and ineffective
influences of pork barrel and logrolling (Maxey 1919). Fourth, there was the
conceptualization of the policy-administration dichotomy, which allowed for a safe
assignment of administrative tasks to hierarchical institutions while reserving policy
activity to democratic institutions (Goodnow 1900; Wilson 1887).
These broad arguments for hierarchical, that is, executive, government were
needed because weighed against them was the concern that hierarchy led back to
autocracy. The American Revolution had been a war against arbitrary rule by a monarch.
The Jacksonian revolution had overturned the vestiges of Hamiltonian and Jeffersonian
rule on the thesis that the United States was headed towards a governmental aristocracy.
These ideas were still live at the end of the nineteenth century. So, the reemergence of
executive government, which was bound to be viewed as the reemergence of the rejected
aristocratic Hamiltonian government, required special explanation.
To meet this need, the intellectuals of the progressive era, particularly Frank
Goodnow, reframed the issue of governance from a matter of autocracy and democracy to
one of responsible vs. irresponsible government. In the old frame, hierarchy looked like
autocracy, thus the presumption was against it. In the new frame, either hierarchy or
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“democracy” could be either responsible or irresponsible. “Responsible,” in this usage,
has a special meaning. It refers specifically to accountability to a higher authority. That
higher authority is the sovereign, which in the democratic metaphysic can only be the
people at large. Goodnow argues that a decentralized over-checked government in which
no one in particular could ever be held accountable for any particular decision – that is,
democratic government with numerous minor elective executive offices, logrolling and
numerous other faults associated with divided government – is de facto irresponsible
government. The reformers recommended a hierarchical government where the chief
executive stands out in the electors’ vision and can be held personally accountable for the
acts or failures of government. They called this arrangment responsible government.
Thus, hierarchy, with its uncomfortable resemblance to monarchy, could be responsible
government under the right circumstances.
Hierarchy and the closely associated idea of expert executive government led to
the origin of the public administration discipline. Initially, there was a focus on the top
executive, which was the elective mayor in the late 1800s, although, even in the 1890s,
there was an awareness of European practices in France and, especially, Germany, where
the chief administrative officer was a career professional, not an elective officer
(Goodnow 1887, 1888, 1889, 1890, 1893; Shaw 1889, 1897). The perception was that
the mayor needed to be “responsible” so that the voters could hold him accountable for
the actions of city government. To be responsible, he needed to hold enough unimpeded
power that he could not blame others for matters that did not go well. Thus, he needed to
be able to hire and fire without interference from city council and he needed primary
control over city fiscal resources. He also needed to be in office long enough to learn the
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ropes and accomplish something (Steffens 1957). Frederick R. Clow quotes Nathan
Matthews, Jr., mayor of Boston from 1891 to 1895, “[B]elieving that the first duty of the
public officer charged with the disbursement of millions of dollars of the public money
was to search the printed reports of the city government for accounts that would show the
cost, from year to year, of equipping and maintaining the various departments of
municipal services, I was amazed to discover that practically there were none” (Clow
1896). The idea of learning to be mayor suggests that there is a profession of governing.
While merely a suggestion in this early thought, it emerged into the foundation of the
discipline of public administration.
There was a particular setback for government reformers that seems to serve as an
epiphany in their thought. This setback was the failed reelection of Seth Low for mayor
of New York in 1903. Low was the anti-Tammany mayor of 1901 and he served for two
years. During this time he accomplished less than he hoped and made enemies. Some of
these failures may have been a result of Low’s personality, although he had been viewed
as a successful mayor of Brooklyn before its merger into greater New York. With Low’s
failure, the good government reformers shifted their thinking once again. First they had
sought to place good men in elective offices. Then, as with Low, they had sought to
place competent men into well designed important elective offices. After Low, they
sought to structure things so that government would be competent throughout. Thus, it is
reasonable to surmise that Seth Low‘s defeat for reelection in 1903 is a critical
motivating factor, the ultimate event that led to the formation of the public administration
discipline (Burks 1912a, 1912b).
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After Low’s defeat, the view became that government, not simply a small number
of elective government officials, must be competent. While this view is not necessarily a
repudiation of Jacksoninan democratic theory for the street sweeper or the policeman on
the beat, it established a ranking, we could say an aristocracy, of governmental roles.
High ranked roles clearly were not compatible with the Jacksonian view. The essential
feature of the new aristocracy was competence. Competence was found in the ability to
fulfill one’s instrumental role in government. Beginning in the late 1800s, but expanding
rapidly after 1910, competence was achieved through university or university-like
training.ii
Some early innovators in training for public services included the Training School
at the Bureau of Municipal Research (1911), which was affiliated with Columbia
University, the City College of New York (1916), Georgetown University (1920), the
School of Citizenship at Syracuse University (1924), the University of Michigan, and the
University of Chicago (Beard 1916; Ogg 1924; Reed 1930). Early disciplinary
academics were also associated with such institutions as the University of Chicago
(Charles Merriam), the University of Pennsylvania (William H. Allen and Frederick
Cleveland as students; Leo S. Rowe), Harvard (A. Lawrence Lowell and William B.
Munro), Princeton (Woodrow Wilson) and Johns Hopkins (W. W. Wiloughby and Frank
Goodnow). One of the founders of the New School was Charles Beard, who was also the
director of the Training School at the Bureau of Municipal Research. Many early
academics were affiliated with political science, although disciplinary boundaries were
not strong in 1900, so they could easily be published in multiple disciplines. This early
training and academic focus formed the core of the subsequent discipline.
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Disciplinary Constraint
As shown in this account, a serious concern throughout the period leading to the
origin of the American public administration discipline has to do with unconstrained
executive power. The nineteenth century solution to this problem had been to create
serious legislative oversight, to distribute power to numerous minor executive officers,
and to constrain the executive to a merely ministerial role whenever possible. The
defects of this solution had led back to larger executive power, but not without
trepidation. Thus, the twentieth century discipline arose under the fear of executive
power. Goodnow‘s formula to relieve this fear is responsibility in form of answerability.
In 1906, the Bureau of City Betterment was formed as under the auspices of the
Citizen’s Union in New York City. In 1907, this unit was reorganized and made
independent under the name Bureau of Municipal Research. The Bureau of Municipal
Research is one of a handful of institutions organized to implement the good government
agenda that generally fell under the auspices of the National Municipal League. Other
organizations included the National Municipal League itself (formed in 1894) and the
municipal statistics division which was assigned to the Department of Labor in 1898 and
then the Census Bureau when it was funded on a permanent basis in 1902 (Meyer 1910).
These institutions took a lead in setting the agenda for the newly forming discipline, none
more so than the Bureau of Municipal Research.
Sometimes the Bureau of Municipal Research is credited with introducing the
idea of governmental budgeting in the United States. This claim is incorrect, the idea of
budgeting was widely known and understood in the decades leading up to the end of the
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nineteenth century (Clow 1896, 1901; Goodnow 1893; Shaw 1897). As Leonard White
has shown, Alexander Hamilton understood the basics of governmental budgeting in the
late 1700s (White 1965a). This budgetary practice was not institutionalized at the federal
level and a truncated form of budgeting that looked more like ad hoc appropriating
eventually came to be the normal federal practice. The degree to which state and local
governments exhibited budgetary practices as opposed to ad hoc appropriating is not well
documented, but the general state of affairs in 1900 reflected a large amount of ad hoc
appropriating and tradition bound irrational budgetary practices.
Goodnow’s formula for responsible government called for better planning than ad
hoc appropriation. Government can only be responsible if it is thinking, and ad hoc
appropriating looked too much like chaos. While the Bureau of Municipal Research did
not introduce budgeting, it did go to considerable trouble to reform budgeting, initially in
New York City. The budgetary reform consisted of realigning the budgetary categories
to match program objectives. Thus, in the pre-reformed budget, money went to the
organization, but could not be linked to particular purposes. In the reformed budget,
money went to units within the organization that were rationally aligned with particular
purposes.
Due to the zealous nature of the reformers and a general distrust of government,
which was always at risk of passing back into the hands of corrupt politicians, these
budgetary reforms got out of hand and soon developed into one of the more pernicious
devices of the twentieth century, the line item budget, which might be better named the
line item appropriation.iii In the mean time, the reformers became more and more closely
aligned with government itself. As a consequence of their closer relationship with
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government and their experience of the undesirable effects of line item budgeting, public
administration disciplinarians developed a second wave of budgetary reform, which they
labeled executive budgeting. The executive budget used the principles of line item and
program/policy focus to develop the budget, but was careful to use something akin to the
lump sum device for appropriation. This allowed for application of the rational technical
skills being taught in the new academic programs, while still permitting executive
discretion.
This series of events makes sense primarily in the context of Goodnow’s political
theory. Initially, reformers were feeling their way along and developing something that
makes the organization competent and responsible. The organization was competent
because there were clear instrumental links between funds and purposes for which they
were spent. It was responsible because the sovereign – the people – were provided the
ability to know how their taxes were used and, in principle, the ability to control that use.
However, the line item appropriationiv clouded responsibility. Use of funds were
restricted, not because the purpose was not approved, but because a particular good or
service was judged not useful by a non-expert legislator. The administrator was not
allowed the discretion necessary to accomplish the aim for which he had been employed.
The solution proffered was another budgetary reform, one that divided the system of
estimation, which continued to rely heavily on technical analysis, from that of
appropriation, which was designed to leave the administrator greater discretion. Only by
allowing the administrator such discretion was the adminstrator made responsible for his
or her action. With discretion restrained, the administrator could shift responsibility to
those who restrain him. They, in turn point to each other and back to the mismanagement
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of the administrator. No one would be answerable to the sovereign. Thus, the line item
budget is not merely an annoying device for budget execution; it is a failure of
governance, creating the very situation it supposedly protects against, irresponsible
government.
Acting out of an acute awareness of their political theory, the early twentieth
century reformers remedied this situation by removing the impediment. That is, they
designed a new budgetary system that put the onus of responsibility onto their preferred
candidate, the head of the executive branch of government. Thus, they reformed their
first reform by proposing executive budgeting. Executive budgeting looks a bit like the
lump sum appropriating these reformers set out to eliminate. What had happened is that
the reformers gained appreciation for the role of discretion in assigning answerability to
the executive. An executive who is hemmed in by a wide array of legislative mandates is
answerable only for complying with the mandates, not answerable for the actual results of
action. However, when relieved of such mandates, she or he is given the ability to act
with initiative and achieve the ends of public policy. Under those circumstances, he or
she can be asked to account for how s/he has progressed to those ends. To achieve that
end, the executive had to be freed from petty mandates. Thus, the line item budget was
rejected in favor of broader, more purpose-oriented budgeting. In reality, executive
budgeting went beyond this level, giving policy initiative to the executive. Conceptually,
this initiative has important consequences for public administration, the heir to these
practices.
This budgetary history shows that the members of the nascent public
administration discipline were very much alert to the link between their political theory
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and its practical implications for administrative practice. From the very early activities at
the Training School at the Bureau of Municipal Research, the education supplied through
the public administration discipline has always included attention to budgeting. Thus,
this rapid and focused reform in budgeting reflects clear attention to the role of
administration in attaining responsible, that is, answerable, government. When this new
discipline changed its attention from local government to the federal government, one of
the first matters it took up was the budget. And, what it sought to do was establish an
executive budgeting system. The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 (modeled after the
executive budgeting pioneered by the Bureau of Municipal Research and promoted by W.
F. Willoughby a colleague and sometimes rival of Frederick Cleveland), followed by the
Roosevelt’s relocating the Bureau of the Budget into the new Executive Office of the
President in 1939 did just that. The principle players in 1939 were the natural heirs to the
original members of the public administration discipline. Throughout this 40 year period,
the discipline was focused on a political theory of responsibility linked to the idea
hierarchy with the head of the pyramid answerable to the voters. This view remains
embedded in the understanding of American democracy today.

Closing the Loop
Elsewhere, I have shown that the practices of performance measurement arose at
the Bureau of Municipal Research in 1906 and developed into something resembling
their current form by 1912 (Williams 2003a). The very categories of governmental
performance that Clarence Ridley examines in Measuring Municipal Government
(1927b), which is clearly recognized as part of the modern performance measurement
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literature, are also found in Henry Bruere’s The New City Government (1912). A more
thorough discussion showing this linkage can be found in Williams (2002), Williams
(2003a), and Williams (2004). In addition to its development at Bureau of Municipal
Research, early performance measurement can be associated with the municipal statistics
division of the Census Bureau, that is, the other major institutional organ of the National
Municipal League’s effort to rationalize governmental finance (Fox 1972, 1977), and
where W. F. Willoughby was employed in an earlier phase of his career.
Performance measurement arose at the same places and in the same time period as
the Bureau of Municipal Research’s (National Municipal League’s) rationalization of
governmental budgeting. The same principal players were involved, and these are among
the principle players associated with creating a discipline of public administration. I have
already argued that rationalized budgeting played a specific role in the political theory
that led to the public administration discipline. It is not a large leap to suppose that
performance measurement might do so, as well. But, what might that role be?
To answer this question, we must begin by eliminating a myth. The myth is that
early performance measurement was strictly concerned with reducing the cost of
government. No realistic account of early government researchv – that is the generic
name under which performance measurement was conducted – can deny a value for
dollars spent objective. Yet, it is equally unrealistic to argue that the value-for-dollars
objective was the only objective sought. The critical objective pursued was to obtain
good results at reasonable costs. I have demonstrated this in considerable detail in
Williams (2003a). The chief component of this demonstration is that the innovators of
government research distinguished between value-for-dollar concepts and results

13

concepts. They were perfectly aware of both (Allen 1907; Bachman 1912). There is
evidence that they tilted towards value-for-dollars, perhaps more so after W. H. Allen and
Henry Bruere left the Bureau of Municipal Research in the early 1910s. Nevertheless,
they demonstrated an interest in results and an interest in the effects of government policy
that went beyond narrow pecuniary aims.
The goal, or at least a goal, of the government research bureau was to assist
government to organize its reporting function so that government reported its activities in
a manner consistent with its budget. The budget itself was organized functionally, that is
consistent with policy objectives. The functional budget was at the same time a policy
device and a cost accounting device, although cost accounting was not very
sophisticatedvi (Buck 1924; Buck and Watson 1926; Cooke 1924). As a budget device,
the functional budget served to allocate public resources according to the policy
preferences of the policy makers. While this allocation would be informed by assertions
of program costs, it is, in principle, a utilitarian device allocating public resources to
public policies in rough proportion to their importance to society as perceived by the
elective representatives. To the degree that the functional categories are well aligned
with policy objectives, a functional budget is a reasonable device for such a purpose.
As an early cost accounting device, the functional budget permits the assignment
of expended funds to the purposes they served. While more sophisticated cost accounting
does a better job than functional budgeting, functional budgeting does a better job than
appropriation to multifunctional work units with no attention to the relationship between
the work units and their policy objectives. Assigning expenditures to purposes is the less
frequently discussed element of a comprehensive performance measurement system. If
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performance is to be consider in economic terms, that is, in terms of value received for
dollars spent, one must be able to associate dollars spent with policy objectives. If one
only examines achievements, without considering dollars spent (or other resources
consumed) to reach those achievements, there is no economic method of comparing
achievements. One may find one achievement more pleasing than another, but it is not
possible to know whether the society put more effort in achieving one or the other.
Consequently, policy makers are not in a very good position to decide whether the policy
results should be selected over other alternate policy results. The functional budget
provided a rudimentary way to overcome this limitation by directly associating costs with
particular program activities, which could be aligned with policy objectives.
With the functional budget serving as a cost accounting device, the pioneers of the
public administration discipline were in a position to evaluate the costs of public policies.
This capacity does not, by itself constitute a performance measurement system. What it
is missing is an observation of the results of public polcy activity. Early innovators
divided such observations into three categories, observation of the activity or effort itself,
observation of the product of the activity, and observation of the consequence of policy
activity (Williams 2003a). In the first category, they were concerned about whether
workers put in a full day’s work and whether they actually performed the work they were
supposed to be doing (Pultz 1912; Welton 1912). In the second category, they ask about
the quantity of work produced (Hartwell 1908; Meyer 1910; North 1905). When work
activity and product are observed, along with reasonably accurate cost data, what one is
able to produce is productivity data. While the degree of accuracy may be debatable, it
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is clear that the pioneers of the public administration discipline were interested in
productivity data and were able to produce it under some circumstances.
Productivity data bears two different messages for two different audiences. For
the public manager it serves as an insight into the operation of the organization. Where
productivity is increasing or, at worst, remaining constant, it communicates a suggestion
of a satisfactorily operating organization. The manager can assign minimal attention to
such operations on the assumption that resources are being used well and subordinates
are making wise decisions with whatever authority they have be delegated. While the
manager still wants to look into the operation from time to time, such productivity data
free the manager to attend to other matters. Where productivity is decreasing, or where
its increase has diminished, the manager is alerted to potential problems. Look here, the
data say, something may have gone wrong.
For the external audience, productivity data report on the public manager’s use of
resources. When productivity declines, fails to improve at an adequate rate, or compares
poorly with comparable entities, the public manager is open to challenge concerning his
discretionary use of resources.vii Thus, the relationship between the public manager and
the external user is one of answerability. The manager answers for his use of resources
by showing how productively he has used those resources.
The link back to the political theory is apparent, but before returning there, there
is a third category of observation: of the consequence of policy activity. It is sometimes
asserted that early public administration academics were not interested in public policy
results (Bouckaert 1990, 1992; Stivers 2000; Waldo 1948). I have argued that there is
substantial evidence that the very earliest innovators were interested in results, which
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interest was one of their chief motivating factors. Their interest in results was probably
not clearly distinguished from their interest in productivity. Frederick Cleveland was the
longest lasting member of the original directors of the Bureau of Municipal research and
he, more than the other two directors, was clearly linked to the National Municipal
League’s financial management initiatives. Still, he sought resolve the weakness in
government financial management in order to improve government capacity, not to save
money, or, at least he says, “It is commonly assumed that the taxpayer pays for graft and
inefficient government. This fallacy has been skillfully used and taught by many a selfseeking demagogue…. If government is not efficient, it is not the taxpayer as taxpayer
who suffers, but each individual member of the community as the beneficiary of public
funds…. The subversions of revenues … is a direct loss to the weak rather than to the
strong” (Cleveland 1909). By confounding these two interests, the bureau directors
made themselves easy targets for contemporaneous and subsequent criticism. However,
it should be no surprise that they had such difficulties, they were innovators in these
ideas. The various forms of performance are often confounded today, in fact, it is not
hard to find a “performance” measurement system that confounds access to resources
with results. If it remains easy to make such errors today, we should at least be
understanding of lesser errors made while the concepts were still being worked out.
So, in an imperfect way, the pioneers of public administration theory sought to
connect the results of public policy back to the plans made in the budget process. All of
critical linkages were conceived to occur in the budget process coordinated through the
device of the functional budget. Prospectively the functional budget provided planning
that was linked to purposes. Retrospectively it provided a cost accounting and reporting
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device that linked plans accomplishments as well as productivity back to decisions. The
rational cycle was complete. The administrator proposed a budget, obtained approval
through the appropriation, implemented the budget as approved, and reported back both
productivity and accomplishment information that revealed how well he fulfilled the will
of the sovereign. The device provided flexible discretion to the administrator while
retaining decision authority with democratic institutions, particularly the legislature.

That was Then
I will suppose that I have shown the plausibility, if not the actuality, that
performance measurement-like practices were central to the American public
administration discipline as it formed as a response to the realization that the
governmental problems of the late nineteenth century were not merely a matter of
corruption. These practices were central because they contributed directly to the
relationship between professional administrator and political representative of the
sovereign. They closed the loop, making the administrator “responsible,” that is
answerable, for his actions. Contrary to some of the misunderstandings of two
generations later, early budgeting and performance measurement were devices for
enhancing administrative discretion, although within clearly delimited scope. The design
was strictly in the form of principal-agent. Within this scope, the objective of a device
like the functional budget and a subsequent report of accomplishment is to free the
administrator-agebt to do what is desired without interference from numerous disruptive
decision maker-principals. Such interference is the specific source of “irresponsible”
government for which expert public administration is a cure.
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It is significant that one of the chief voices linking performance measurement of
1910 to the modern era is Clarence Ridley. He was the executive director of the
International City Managers Association (ICMA) from 1928 through 1956. As I have
already discussed, without making much of a point of it, municipal government was the
focal point of the early public administration discipline. This focus arose in part because
corruption and failure in local government were among the chief motivators that led to
the formation of good government groups in the late 1800s. Those good government
groups became the motivation behind the eventual development of the discipline. As the
executive director of the ICMA, Ridley was at the center.
The ICMA actually plays a much more significant role than one might surmise
from even these facts. The ICMA became the central membership organization for city
managers. The role of the city manager is practically a summary of the struggle over
competence in local government. In the early 1800s township government followed
either the New England model of town meeting or the Southern model of representative
councils. Executive roles were divided and elective. Eventually, the executive role was
unified in the strong mayor in some localities, while councils came to look like bicameral
state legislatures. The continued failure of this process led to other experiments such as
assigning some local powers to the state, developing devices such as the New York City
Board of Estimate, which ultimately fell under control of the mayor, forming of
independent authorities, shrinking and unifying municipal councils, and forming the
commission form of government. Many of these devices remain with us today and may
seem to reflect natural developments of mysterious origin, but at the time of their origin,
the reflected a struggle between executive and legislative led government. The ultimate
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disposition of this struggle in large cities is the strong mayor-council government. In the
great majority of other jurisdictions, the manager-council form of government prevailed.
The manager-council form of government is alleged to have been invented in
Stanton, Virginia in 1906 almost by accident and then modified and promoted by Richard
Childs. This story is both true to the facts and almost entirely mythical with respect to its
intellectual basis. Childs borrowed the extremely small council of the commission form
of government and grafted it onto the professionally managed government design that
Staunton was observed to be using and then promoted it through his organization which
had national scope. His promotion managed to get the practice adopted by enough
municipalities to get the practice rolling. This much is well documented (East 1965;
Stillman 1974). However, the story does not start in Staunton in 1906 nor with Richard
Childs. The story starts at least 20 years earlier with the work of Frank Goodnow and
Albert Shaw studying and communicating the municipal government practices of
European countries (Goodnow 1893; Shaw 1897). Goodnow and Shaw are particularly
admiring of the administrative practices of France and Germany, specifically, of the use
of professional managers in local government. They provide the American audience
considerable information about these practices and prepare the way for the concept of an
administrative manager of local government. The Prussian practices under the title
burgomeister are so similar to the city manager that later, in 1926, William Munro makes
the comparison in reverse using the city manager as the comparative to reveal the role of
the burgomeister to the American audience (Munro 1926).
We could imagine that this is a curious and obscure story that is not quite
adequately credited in the history of the city manager. But is it important? First, we
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should keep in mind the critical role of the city manager in the political theory of public
administration. If the strong mayor is the archetype of the reformer’s objectives before
the Seth Low epiphany, the city manager is the archetype of the public administrator.
The city manager is the mayor, but professionalized and removed from electoral politics.
Furthermore, the city manager allows for a simultaneous strong executive design and
something approaching parliamentary government. There is, on the Goodnow political
theory, only one glaring defect with the city manager, which is that he is in no way
directly responsible to the electorate. However, two elements of public administration
theory have provided for this development. First, the policy-administration dichotomy
allows the city manager to survive as an professional governmental expert, so long as he
is an administrator rather than a policy maker. As late as the 1960s, and in spite of
considerable evidence to the contrary, Richard Childs continued to argue that, in fact, city
managers had no policy making role and that those who strayed into policy making were
behaving improperly (Childs 1965; East 1965). Second, arose the closely related myth of
political neutral competence. Competence was the characteristic that the university
trained city manager was to bring and this competence was to serve the policies of any
city council regardless of party. This is the language of political neutrality that is
sometimes taught in graduate education even today, “regardless of party.” This language
is not really policy neutral, one can be a policy partisan while party neutral, not when the
parties and the policies are closely aligned, but even in the late 1800s it was often
remarked that national parties are not often closely aligned with local policy issues.
Political neutrality is, therefore, a somewhat equivocal concept. Still, setting that issue
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aside, competence within the framework of the policy-administration dichotomy allowed
the city manager to be part of “responsible” government.
Both the fulfillment of this role and the achievement of the equivocation
discussed above can be closely related to the budgetary activities and the loop back
through measurement and reporting. In the budgetary role the city manager coordinates a
budget proposal providing the expert guidance the council needs to fulfill its legislative
role. Of course, in so doing he absorbs a tremendous amount of discretion. Try as we
might to describe this as technical competence, we must acknowledge that administrators
at the rank of city manager make policy recommendations in such quantity and scope that
they are making de facto policy decisions, thus the equivocation. As John East’s account
of the thought of Richard Child shows, the city manager is a thoroughly political position,
in the sense of policy making, and has been from the beginning (East 1965).
So, one of the threads of responsible government has been questioned, perhaps
cut. Our political theory may hang by the other thread, reporting back. Here, during the
Ridley years, the ICMA made a serious effort to fulfill this role. Ridley inherited the
intellectual work of performance measurement from Lent Upsonviii (Ridley 1927a) and
developed the concepts as a professor at University of Chicago, as the executive director
of the ICMA and as the editor of many ICMA publications (Vogel 1967). He also took
on an assistant, Herbert Simon, with whom he published numerous articles on
measurement (Lee 2003). Over time, measurement became a more and more technical
activity, which suggests a new danger, which is loss of relevance for the public audience
(Williams 2003b). However, throughout Ridley’s years at ICMA, the organization
continued to promote communication of performance information to the public (Ridley

22

and Simon 1939, 1948). Thus, under Ridley’s watch, performance measurement
remained a component of responsible government, where the sovereign retain decision
making authority while extending discretionary authority to their professional
subordinates.

This is Now
So that was public administration in its formative years. The political theory of
responsible government provided a sound justification for a hierarchical executive expert
government that would be simultaneously consistent with democratic sovereignty. On
this theory, political neutrality and the policy-administrative dichotomy were not
mistaken empirical observations about the practice of government, they were critical
normative conditions required to achieve adequate administrative discretion without
violating democratic sovereignty. But now we have had 100 years of Paul Applebys,
John Gauses, Michael Lipskys, etc. (Appleby 1949, 1970; Gaus, White and Dimock
1936; Lipsky 1980). The collective view of these scholars is that discrection is dispersed
throughout the organization and is found in every decision made at every level. It is not
too extreme to say that the point of employing thinking individuals is so that they will use
discretion well. No matter how much the normative voices may prefer a policyadministration dichotomy, the empirical reality is that implementation inherently implies
discretion and discretion inherently implies policy making.
What, then, of the theory that got us started? Is public administration illegitimate
usurpation of the democratic sovereignty? One way to avoid the affirmative is to reject
the political theory upon which it rests. Perhaps the responsible officer answerable to the
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people as sovereign is an anarchic concept? This is not territory I propose to explore. An
alternative is to seek legitimacy through some variant of the Jacksonian model, that is
assign the administrators themselves the role of the microcosm. If the bureaucrats are the
representatives, then their exercise of policy making discretion is not problematic. The
representative bureaucracy is a widely recognized pardigm. However, this solution calls
into question the barrier that has been raised against patronage. While patronage appears
to be an illegitimate device for selecting competent administrators, it is not such a
problematic device for selecting representative administrators. The expert adminstrator is
employed specifically to supplant the patronage administrator. Patronage administrators
are answerable to the people through their sponsors, so their discretion is not a
democratic problem. However, expert administrators are protected from sponsors, thus
they cannot be answerable to the people in this way. Perhaps the administrator represents
directly, but the requirement of expertise certainly distorts this representation. The
Jacksoninan paradigm worked better when administrators were in fact from the general
population. Charles Goodsell devotes a chapter of The Case for Bureaucracy to the
evidence that bureaucrats are like the general population (Goodsell 1985); however, the
evidence is likely insufficiently discrete. That is, health officials are likely in general like
the population, but when you get to topics related to health, they may not be; police
likewise on topics of crime.
Another solution is to question the concept of democratic sovereignty. Perhaps
this idea, however appealing to common thought, is unrealistic in complex society. On
close examination, a typical governmental agency may exhibit only a modest linkage
between with democratic processes. Most decisions are made by administrators based on
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technical rationale. Even many legislative decisions are made at the initiative of the
agency or based on its advice after it has discarded many alternatives. A major theme of
budgeting literature for the past half century or longer has been that agencies hold the
upper hand because of their monopoly access to information, the point of which is that
they exercise substantial control over this central policy process (Bendor, Taylor and
Gaalen 1985; Blais and Dion 1991; Eavey 1987; Eavey and Miller 1984; Niskanen 1971,
1991; Wood and Waterman 1991). These views are, of course, controversial, but it is at
least plausible that the budgetary process results in decisions that are predetermined, or at
least severely restricted, by administrators. Perhaps there is no responsible state reporting
to the popular sovereign.
Before giving up on the responsible state, let us examine the devices of
responsibility created at the origins of the discipline. These devices consist of the budget
and the report. As already discussed, the budget is, at least allegedly, co-opted by the
non-elective expert administrators, raising questions about sovereignty. More concretely,
in a typical scenario, the non-elective expert defines as much of his work as possible as
technical, capturing what others might consider to be value decisions as matters of
science instead. Safety engineers set minimum height of stair rails and maximum height
of stair risers as matters of science. Welfare experts set income standards as matters of
science. This “science” becomes captured in regulations and budgets. Through
regulations, organizations can give their judgments the force of law. Through budgets
they can select their own future, adding here and pruning there. In this way, the public
administrator becomes the benign autocrat. They are benign in that they are likely
committed to the objectives of their programs, thus, their error, if they exhibit one, is
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what Herman Finer called “overfeasance” (Finer 1941), that is providing all too much of
their particular service. But, they are autocrats, or, to use Goodnow's language, they are
at risk of being irresponsible in that they appear to answer to no one.
However, the budget is only one side of the answerability loop devised by early
public administrationists. The other side is reporting, not only performance reporting, but
a variety of reporting devices including strict financial accounting and audits, to political
devices such as the annual report. Each such report provides an opportunity for the
public administrator to be answerable for a role in governance. Financial reports and the
audit provide for strict accountability for money handling, that is to show that money has
been managed honestly and, where there could be risk, wisely. In this way, the sovereign
can see that tax dollars have not been stolen or misspent. The agency can also report on
its overall activity in the annual report. Some early public administrationists considered
the annual report to be the proper device for communicating performance information
(Allen 1909; Allen 1907; Beyle 1928; Kilpatrick 1928; Ridley 1937; Ridley and Simon
1939, 1948), however, this report can also be used to communicate information about
mattters that may not be strictly performance related, such as information about the
organization itself or information about potential new initiatives.
Through reporting, the organization can answer to the public about what it has
done with their governmental power and with their resources, can advise them of how
these may be used in the future, and provide information about success both in terms of
results achieved and comparative use of resources to achieve these resources. Also,
through reporting, the public agency can answer directly to the public, not just indirectly
to the public's representatives.
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These remarks on reporting possibilities are relatively speculative and optimistic
compared with the quite harsh assertions about the co-opted budgetary process. In part
this speculation reflects the underexamined nature of public reporting (Mordecai Lee,
personal conversation). Nevertheless, the optimisim may not be justified. For example,
the recent history of private sector financial reporting suggests a high risk of intentional
obstuctification instead of openness. Regulators may have tilted towards the intersts of
management rather than the intersts of report recipients. Public sector reporting could
exhibit similar defects. If so, reports would not provide an opportunity for answerability.

Conclusion
In this paper I have proposed that public administration is critically linked to the
notion of answerable government because, in its absence, the public administrator's
execercise of discretion is a violation of democratic sovereignty. I have also argued that
the public administration discipline arose around this political theory and this problem. I
argue that this problem remains with us today and is more, not less, acute because the
policy-administration dichotomy is incompatible with empricial reality. I propose that
the two chief devices for resolving this problem within the practice of administration are
budgeting and reporting, particularly reporting of results. I cite the existing body of
literature on budgeting to argue that budgeting is coopted out of the role of
accountability. Consequently only reporting remains. By analolgy to the private sector,
reporting may be coopted as well. If so, the upshot would appear to be that the
administrator violates democratic sovereignity whenever he exercises discretion, which
would seem to be almost constantly. This argument strongly supports the view that
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reporting, such as performance reporting, is central to the discipline of public
administration and to the legitimacy of public administration practice. No apparent
alternative is compatible with both competent administration and standard American
views of democracy.

Endnotes

Bibliography

Allen, William. 1909. School Progress and School Facts. New York; New York Bureau of
Municipal Research.
Allen, William H. 1907. Efficient Democracy. New York; Dodd, Mead & Company.
Appleby, Paul H. 1949. Policy and Administration; University of Alabama Press.
Appleby, Paul H. 1970. Big democracy. New York; Russell & Russell.
Bachman, Frank P. 1912. Attaining Efficiency in City School Systems. Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science. 41(May):158-175.
Beard, Charles A. 1916. Training for Efficient Public Service. The Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science. 64(March):215-226.
Bendor, Jonathan, Serge Taylor, and Roland Van Gaalen. 1985. Bureaucratic Expertise versus
Legislative Authority: A Model of Deception and Monitoring in Budgeting. The American
Political Science Review. 79(4):1041-1060.
Beyle, Herman Carey. 1928. Governmental reporting in Chicago. Chicago; The Unversity press.
Blais, André and Stéphane Dion. 1991. The Budget-maximizing bureaucrat : appraisals and
evidence. Pittsburgh, Pa.; University of Pittsburgh Press.

28

Bouckaert, Geert. 1990. The History of the Productivity Movement. Public Productivity and
Management Review. XIV(1 (Fall)):53-89.
Bouckaert, Geert. 1992. Public Productivity in Retrospective. Pages 15-46 in Public Productivity
Handbook. M. Holzer, ed. Marcel Dekker, Inc., New York.
Bruere, Henry. 1912. The New City Government. New York; D. Appleton and Company.
Buck, A. E. 1924. Measuring The Results of Government. National Municipal Review.
13(March):152-157.
Buck, A. E. and William Watson. 1926. Cost Accounting. in Municipal Finance. A. E. Buck, ed.
The MacMillan Co, New York.
Burks, Jesse D. 1912a. Efficiency Standards in Municipal Management. National Municipal
Review. 1(July):364-371.
Burks, Jesse D. 1912b. The Outlook for Municipal Efficiency in Philadelphia. The Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science. 41(May):245-261.
Childs, Richard S. 1965. The first 50 years of the council-manager plan of municipal government;
Distributed only by National Municipal League].
Cleveland, Frederick Albert. 1909. Chapters on municipal administration and accounting. New
York; Longmans.
Clow, Frederick R. 1896. Suggestions for the Study of Municipal Finance. Quarterly Journal of
Economics. 10(4):455-466.
Clow, Frederick R. 1901. A Comparative Study of the Administration of City Finances in the
United States with Special Reference to the Budget. Publications of the American
Economic Association, 3rd series. 2(4 (Nov.)):7-148.
Commons, John R. 1902. Referendum and Initiative in City Government. Political Science
Quarterly. 17(4 (Dec.)):609-630.
Cooke, Morris L. 1924. The Influence of Scientific Management Upon Government - Federal, State
and Municipal. Bulletin Of The Taylor Society. 9(1):31-38.
Durand, E. Dana. 1900a. Council Government versus Mayor Government. I. Political Science
Quarterly. 15(3):426-451.
Durand, E. Dana. 1900b. Council Government Versus Mayor Government. II. Political Science
Quarterly. 15(4):675-709.

29

East, John Porter. 1965. Council-manager government the political thought of its founder, Richard
S. Childs. Chapel Hill; University of North Carolina Press.
Eavey, Cheryl L. 1987. Bureaucratic Competition and Agenda Control. Journal of Conflict
Resolution. 31(3):503-524.
Eavey, Cheryl L. and Gary J. Miller. 1984. Bureaucratic Agenda Control: Imposition or
Bargaining? The American Political Science Review. 78(3):719-733.
Finer, Herman. 1941. Administrative Responsibility in Democratic Government. Public
Administration Review. 1(Summer):335-350.
Fox, Kenneth P. 1972. The Census Bureau and the Cities: National Development of Urban
Government in the Industrial Age: 1870-1930. Philadelphia; University of Pennsylvania.
Fox, Kenneth P. 1977. Better City Government: Innovation in American Urban Politics, 18501937. Philadelphia; Temple University Press.
Gaus, John Merriman, Leonard D. White, and Marshall E. Dimock. 1936. The Frontiers of Public
Administration. New York; Russell & Russell.
Goodnow, Frank J. 1887. Local Government in England. Political Science Quarterly. 2(4
(Dec.)):638-665.
Goodnow, Frank J. 1888. The English Local Government Law. Political Science Quarterly. 3(2
(Jun.)):311-333.
Goodnow, Frank J. 1889. Local Government in Prussia I. Political Science Quarterly. 4(4):648-666.
Goodnow, Frank J. 1890. Local Government in Prussia II. Political Science Quarterly. 5(1):124158.
Goodnow, Frank J. 1893. Comparative administrative law an analysis of the administrative
systems, national and local, of the United States, England, France and Germany; G. P.
Putnam's.
Goodnow, Frank J. 1900. Politics and Administration; A Study in Government. New York; Russell
& Russell.
Goodsell, Charles T. 1985. The case for bureaucracy
a public administration polemic. Chatham; Chatham House Publishers.
Hartwell, Edward M. 1908. Federal Census Reports: Statistics of Cities, 1905. Publications of the
American Statistical Association. 11(82 (Jun. 1908)):195-221.

30

Kilpatrick, Wylie. 1928. Reporting Municipal Government. New York; Municipal Administration
Service.
Lee, Mordecai. 2003. Is There Anything New Under the Sun? Herbert Simon's Contributions in the
1930s to Perfomance Measurement and Public Reporting of Performance Results. Public
Voices. VI(2-3):72-82.
Lipsky, Michael. 1980. Street-level bureaucracy : dilemmas of the individual in public services.
New York; Russell Sage Foundation.
Lynn, Laurence E. Jr. 1996. Public management as art, science, and profession. Chatham; Chatham
House Publishers.
Maxey, Chester Collins. 1919. A Little History of Pork. National Municipal Review.
8(December):691-705.
Meyer, Ernst C. 1910. The National Census Bureau and Our Cities. Proceedings of the American
Political Science Association. 7(Seventh Annual Meeting):126-137.
Munro, William Bennett. 1926. The Government of American Cities. 4th ed. New York; The
Macmillan Company.
Niskanen, William A. 1971. Bureaucracy and representative government. Chicago; Aldine
Atherton.
Niskanen, William A. 1991. A Reflection on Bureaucracy and Representative Government. Pages
13-22 in The Budget-maximizing bureaucrat : appraisals and evidence. A. Blais and S.
Dion, eds. University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, Pa.
North, S. N. D. 1905. Statistics of Cities Having A Population of Over 25,000 1902 and 1903.
Washington; Department of Commerce and Labor.
Ogg, Frederic A. 1924. Personal and Miscellaneous. The American Political Science Review.
18(4):792-800.
Pultz, J. Leggett. 1912. Economy and Efficiency In the Department of Water Supply, Gas and
Electricity, New York City. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science. 41(May):78-85.
Reed, Thomas H. 1930. Appendix IX: Training for the Public Service. The American Political
Science Review. 24(1, Report of the Committee on Policy of the American Political Science
Association):173-179..
Ridley, Clarence E. 1937. Municipal Reports Taken Seriously. Public Opinion Quarterly. 1(1
(Jan.)):112-116.

31

Ridley, Clarence Eugene. 1927a. Means of Measuring Municipal Government. Partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of doctor of philosophy, Syracuse University, Syracuse,
NY.
Ridley, Clarence Eugene. 1927b. Measuring Municipal Government: suggested standards for
measuring the results of fire, health, police and public works departments. New York;
Municipal Administration Service.
Ridley, Clarence Eugene and Herbert Alexander Simon. 1939. Specifications for the annual
municipal report: suggestions for the content, preparation, design, publication and
distribution of the annual municipal report. Chicago; The International City Managers'
Association.
Ridley, Clarence Eugene and Herbert Alexander Simon. 1948. Specifications for the annual
municipal report: suggestions for the content, preparation, design, publication and
distribution of the annual municipal report. Chicago; International City Managers'
Association.
Shaw, Albert. 1889. Municipal Governments in Great Britain. Political Science Quarterly. 4(2
(June 1889)):197-229.
Shaw, Albert. 1897. Municipal Government in Continental Europe. New York; The Century Co.
Steffens, Lincoln. 1957. The shame of the cities. New York; Sagamore Press.
Stillman, Richard Joseph. 1974. The rise of the city manager a public professional in local
government. Albuquerque; University of New Mexico Press.
Stivers, Camilla. 2000. Bureau Men, Settlement Women: Constructing Public Administration in the
Progressive Era. Lawrence, KS; University Press of Kansas.
Vogel, Donald Barry. 1967. The Origin Growth and Development of the International City
Manager's Association. Doctoral, University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa.
Waldo, Dwight. 1948. The administrative state a study of the political theory of American public
administration. New York; Ronald Press Co.
Waldo, Dwight. 1955. The study of public administration. New York; Random House.
Welton, Benjamin F. 1912. The Problem of Securing Efficiency in Municipal Labor. The Annals of
the American Academy of Political and Social Science. 41(May):103-114.
White, Leonard Dupee. 1965a. The Federalists a study in administrative history, 1789-1801; The
Free Press.

32

White, Leonard Dupee. 1965b. The Jacksonians a study in administrative history, 1829-1861; The
Free Press.
White, Leonard Dupee. 1965c. The Jeffersonians a study in administrative history, 1801-1829; Free
Press.
White, Leonard Dupee and Jean Schneider. 1965. The Republican era a study in administrative
history, 1869-1901. First Free Press Paperback Edition 1965 ed. New York; Free Press.
Williams, Daniel W. 2002. Before Performance Measurement. Administrative Theory and Praxis.
24(6):457-486.
Williams, Daniel W. 2003a. Measuring Government in the Early Twentieth Century. Public
Administration Review. 63(6):643-659.
Williams, Daniel W. 2003b. Performance Measurement in the Age of Scientific Management.
Washington DC.
Williams, Daniel W. 2004. Evolution of Performance Measurement until 1930. Administration &
Society. In Press.
Wilson, Woodrow. 1887. The Study of Administration. Political Science Quarterly. 2(2
(Jun.)):197-222.
Wood, B. Dan and Richard W. Waterman. 1991. The Dynamics of Political Control of the
Bureaucracy. The American Political Science Review. 85(3):801-828..
Woodruff, Clinton Rogers. 1903. The Nationalization of Municipal Movements. Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science. 21(2):100-108.

i

I am deliberately emphasizing the American element of what I am discussing.
This division between the foot soldiers and the aristocracy remains with the discipline today, only
a small number of public administration academics are interested in the entire body of public
service employees. Most are interested in administrators, managers, or policy makers. Because the
particular professions account for many specific skills, the discipline has often serviced staff roles
such as budget analysts, personnel officers, and policy analysts. It also supports the general
management skills needed by the technical specialist who has been promoted into a management
role or who aspires to move into a senior policy making role.
iii
The line item budget has two major faults. First, it inappropriately encourages decision makers to
focus too deeply into the organization, second-guessing decisions that better belong with managers.
If the managers are really not to be trusted to make such decisions, they should be discharged, not
monitored like thieves. When monitoring managers in this manner, decision makers ignore their
real responsibility, the goals and major decisions of government. Second, line item appropriation is
essentially unimplementable. Real time events overwhelm the best planning, appropriations in too
ii
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much detail lock funds into the wrong categories making them unavailable to meet the real needs
that arise during the budgetary year.
iv
Line item appropriation appears to have developed from too closely linking the rational
techniques of estimating the budget and recording its expenditure with the device of appropriation.
It may also reflect a “control” objective related to curbing administrative discretion (both corrupt
and otherwise).
v
Government research also involved a broader range of activities, which would now be called
needs assessment, policy analysis, organizational analysis, management consulting, and whatever
else might be needed to shore up the agencies and functions of government. These functional
activities have become the discipline’s components. Not all of these can be linked to the theoretical
source of the discipline, some simply served ad hoc pragmatic purposes. Yet, we have reason to
think that performance measurement is part of the core theoretical discipline.
vi
There is little evidence of more sophisticated cost accounting before the direct participation by
members of the scientific management community, and in particular Morris Cooke. Cook suggests,
primarily through his criticism, that he introduced modest cost accounting sophistication in his role
as a public administrator in Philadelphia in the mid-1910s. More developed cost accounting was
introduced by A. E. Buck and William Watson in the 1920s (Buck 1924; Buck and Watson 1926),
and there is spotty discussion of cost accounting in the ensuing decades. Quality cost accounting
can be found in very little of local or state government today, except perhaps with government
enterprises.
vii
All too often, such a challenge is taken as a forgone conclusion that the public manager is doing
a poor job managing resources, but, of course, this is intellectually indefensible. First, we should
note that cost data are poorly developed because they come from a functional budget, which likely
does not correctly expense capital expenditures and may misclassify other expenses with respect to
the public policy they actually serve. Second, policy objectives may vary in difficulty between
jurisdictions. Third, the policy objectives themselves may only appear to be comparable between
entities. And, fourth, delivery of the policy activity at the lowest cost may be so parsimonious as to
undermine the fulfillment of the policy objective.
viii
Lent Upson directed the Detroit Bureau of Municipal Research for many years before going on
to become a professor and the Dean at Wayne State University. He was directly associated with the
origin of our system of national crime reporting in 1930.
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